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Abstract 
Active employer resistance to trade union recognition is often explained through the rubric of the 
unitary ideology. Yet little attention has been devoted to an examination of unitarism as an 
explanatory construct for active employer hostility. This paper contributes to current knowledge and 
understanding on contemporary ideological opposition to unions, by placing unitarism under 
analytical scrutiny. Using empirical data from the Republic of Ireland, the article applies a conceptual 
framework to a sample of non-union employers who actively resisted unionisation. The paper 
concludes by examining the ideological commitments uncovered and relevant implications. 
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1. Introduction 
In liberal-market economies formal recognition of trade unions by employers is perceived as 
one of the central building blocks of trade unionism (Gall, 2007). Yet in the present historical 
juncture, where non-recognition and employer opposition appear in the ascendancy, the issue 
of anti-unionism has become pronounced as scholars seek to identify its antecedents and 
content. Operating within such narratives has been a sociological strain of interpretation, 
locating active employer anti-unionism to the concept of unitarism. Existing studies of active 
employer resistance have all typically cited unitarism as an explanatory factor (Bacon, 1999; 
Dundon, 2002; Simms, 2003; Gall, 2004; Moore, 2004). The continued growth of non-
recognition for example, has led Dundon and Gollan (2007: 1194) to propose that unitarism 
has become a “ubiquitous managerial ideology”, while Flood and Toner (1997) have argued 
that union avoidance amongst employers stems not so much from economic advantage as an 
attachment to ideological unitarism. Such recurrence in the literature begs the question as to 
what unitarism precisely entails. In doing so, one might return to the contributions of the 
industrial sociologist Alan Fox and his seminal research paper to the Donovan Commission 
(Fox, 1966a). Here Fox proposed a distinctive account of an employer ideology which 
characterised the firm as a homogenous community united by shared interests; where conflict 
was deviant and trade unionists were ‘troublemakers’ competing with employers for the 
loyalty of employees.  
 
Yet two gaps subsequently arise when deploying unitarism to explain active employer 
resistance to trade union recognition. First, such exercises have suffered from an excess of 
deduction and a paucity of empirically-based data on the make-up of employer ideology. 
Whilst there have been broad studies of contemporary management attitudes suggestive of a 
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unitary bent (Poole et al. 2005; Geare et al. 2006), unitarism per se has rarely been examined 
in the context of resistance and there has been little research into the extent to which its 
characteristics inform the ideologies of employers who actively oppose union recognition. 
Few studies have had empirical access to union-resistant employers, with analysis of 
unitarism, as a consequence, based on conjecture and inference of a presumed intent (c.f. Gall 
and McKay, 2001; Dundon, 2002; Peetz, 2002; Simms, 2003; Gall, 2004; Moore, 2004). 
Whilst reasonable, this hardly suffices in exploring the strength or intensity of union-resistant 
employer support for the particulars of the unitary ideology empirically. The second gap 
relates to the point that unitarism is likely to manifest different degrees of emphasis (Fox, 
1974: 297-313). Variations of unitarism can be discerned between those which are essentially 
apologetics for brute authoritarianism and those which emphasise, more benignly, the value 
of employee loyalty and commitment in a union-free milieu (Walton, 1985; Kessler and 
Purcell, 2003; Legge, 2005). Yet such variation is not adequately accounted for either in the 
aforementioned studies of anti-unionism or in broader analysis of unitarism which has 
focused exclusively on its ‘soft’ rendering in the form of sophisticated human resource 
management (HRM) (Provis, 1996; Geare et al. 2006; Budd and Bhave, 2008).  
 
In light of such gaps, this paper specifically examines variations of unitarism among 
employers who actively oppose union recognition claims. It achieves this by examining 43 
empirical cases of employer resistance in Ireland, a typical liberal-market economy with a 
largely voluntarist or collective laissez-faire employment relations tradition. Given the 
literature’s acknowledgement that one of the more difficult hurdles for union recognition is 
overcoming the anti-union sentiments of employers (Bryson et al. 2004; Heery and Simms, 
2011), enquiry into ideological antipathy is of value. The article proceeds as follows: In 
Sections Two and Three, unitarism as a conceptual construct is reviewed, leading to an 
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analytical framework with operational indicators for subsequent empirical application. 
Section Four provides an outline and justification of the empirical research setting. Section 
Five explains the methodology deployed. Section Six reports the results, whilst Section Seven 
concludes with a review of the main findings and their implications. 
 
2. Unitarism and employer ideology 
Whilst reference to ‘unitarism’ in employment relations appears first in the work of Ross 
(1958), it is with Alan Fox that the concept is predominately associated. Fox treated unitarism 
as an employer ideology: a phenomenon he perceived as an ‘instrument of legitimisation’ 
justifying employer rule by seeking to evoke loyalty and commitment from other social 
classes (Fox, 1966b: 372; Fox, 1971: 124). This is similar to contemporary formulations of 
ideology which see it as directed towards public persuasion or how one wants others to see 
the world (Honderich, 2005; Geare et al. 2006; Budd and Bhave, 2008: 94). This is of a 
different calibre to a ‘frame of reference’, a term occasionally used in a similar manner to 
describe unitarism (Fox, 1966a). For Budd and Bhave (2008), frames of reference describe an 
epistemic device to guide one’s action and evaluation. Therefore whilst an ideology and 
frame of reference can easily coalesce, viewing ideology as value-loaded public exposition, 
enables the possibility that individuals speak with one set of assumptions, but practice from 
another.  
 
In any case, Fox’s treatment of unitarism as an ideology is tacitly organised around three 
conceptual dimensions, reflecting distinct themes of employer authority, workplace conflict 
and trade unionism. 
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Employer Authority  
Fox (1966a: 3) proposes that a unitarist ideology portrays the firm as holding “one source of 
authority and one focus of loyalty”. Employers’ prerogative is “legitimate, rational and 
accepted” and employees are assumed to identify unreservedly with the aims of the firm and 
its method of operating (p.3). Team-like metaphors abound, with the parties to the 
organisation viewed as joint partners striving towards mutually-shared goals. This stands in 
marked contrast to ‘pluralist’ interpretations where the sphere of employer authority is 
conceived as limited, given the legitimate existence of competing interest groups and 
inevitable points of tension in the wage effort bargain (p.14).  
 
Workplace conflict 
Under unitarism, opposition to employers is treated as “unnecessary and exceptional”, 
“irrational”, “deviant” and even a “pathological social condition” (Fox, 1966a: 13). The 
harmonious treatment of employment relations necessitates that where conflict occurs, it is 
purely frictional, caused by miscommunications, misunderstandings or “the work of agitators 
inciting the supine majority” (p.12). Opposition lacks legitimacy and winning consent 
through negotiation is not only regarded as time-consuming, but objectionable in principle (p. 
54). This is in marked antithesis to pluralism which views conflict as an inevitable feature of 
the employment relationship. Pluralists legitimise conflict as evidence that employees’ 
aspirations are being neither sapped by despondency nor suppressed by coercive power.  
 
Trade unionism 
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Unitarism has little sympathy for trade unionism. Unions are treated as “invaders of a private 
realm”, wilfully disrupting the “natural pursuit of common purpose” and “rational managerial 
authority” (Fox, 1966a: 33). Keeping the union out is thought to strengthen employees’ 
loyalty to the employer. Indeed, unions are seen as competitors: vying malevolently for the 
commitment of employees. Again this stands in contrast to pluralism, where unions are seen 
to reflect inherent antagonisms within the employment relationship, offering a legitimate 
medium through which such problems might be resolved and the interests of employees can 
be represented. 
 
Within each of these conceptual themes of unitarism, a number of subtle blends can be 
discerned between autocratic variants on one hand and benevolent dispositions on the other. 
Echoes of this distinction are often found in considering the soft and hard variants of HRM 
(Fombrun et al. 1984; Thompson, 2011) and in expositions on partnership (Ackers and 
Payne, 1999; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Martinez-Lucio and Stewart, 2004). Specific to 
unitarism, Fox (1974: 297-313) made numerous references to exploitative and paternalistic 
assumptions underscoring various unitary ideologies, a theme subsequently developed in the 
‘management style’ literature. Whilst there appears to be some distinction between ideology 
and ‘style’ (c.f Purcell and Sisson, 1983; Purcell, 1987: 534; Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1993), 
there is much overlap. Relevant material can therefore be derived from the style literature in 
further building upon the conceptualisation of employer ideology. In doing so it is possible to 
locate different variants of unitarism. These are Traditional (c.f. Fox, 1974; Purcell and 
Sisson, 1983), Paternalist (c.f. Fox, 1974; Purcell, 1987; Kessler and Purcell, 2003) and 
Human Relations (c.f. Fox, 1966b; Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1993) variants of the unitary 
ideology. Whilst these classifications reflect standard literature attempts, in what follows the 
paper synthesises these basic distinctions to add a more detailed level of conceptual 
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elaboration by augmenting them with the conceptual themes of employer authority, 
workplace conflict and trade unionism.  
 
Traditional 
Although Fox’s (1974: 297) ‘Traditional’ unitarism sought to capture an ideology varying 
“between the extremes of benevolent paternalist and crudely exploitative”, we follow Purcell 
and Sisson’s (1983) re-conceptualisation of ‘Traditional’ unitarism as entrenched in the latter 
mode of emphasis. This unitarism is likely to see employment relations in terms of the 
“constantly asserted and enforced right of the master to demand unquestioning obedience 
from his servants” (Fox, 1974: 297). Employer authority is conceived in a strongly autocratic 
fashion, whilst employee opposition is deemed illegitimate on the grounds that “in entering 
into the contract of employment, the employee legitimises the employer directing and 
controlling his activities, especially in relation to time, place, content and method of work 
and legitimises, too, the employer’s use of sanctions necessary to maintain this obedience” 
(Fox, 1971: 40). Obstinacy towards trade union recognition is likely to rest upon notions of 
non-interference in property or managerial rights. 
 
Paternalism 
‘Paternalist’ unitarism emphasises avuncular care and responsibility for employee welfare as 
a means of legitimising employer control (Heery and Noon, 2001: 255). Whilst Purcell 
(1987) notes that it retains the Traditional autocratic approach to employer authority, this is 
distilled with more benevolent inclinations. In handling conflict, Paternalists may be able to 
“to rationalise that they need be cruel to be kind by overriding purely short-term 
preoccupations or limited perspectives produced by employee ignorance or folly” (Fox, 1974: 
241). Where employees contest employer decisions this is attributed to misunderstandings on 
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their part (Purcell, 1987). Hostility to trade unions appears to be reasoned on the grounds that 
they are unnecessary given the employer can, or will, articulate an enlightened approach to 
managing employee welfare. As Fox (1974: 249) notes, “mistrust of collective bargaining is 
sometimes expressed precisely because it is said to encourage the ‘two sides’ mentality”. 
Such divisions would ultimately be incongruent with the familial metaphor that pervades 
paternalist sentiments.  
 
Human Relations 
The Human Relations variant of unitarism emphasises the engineering of a cooperative 
employment climate, based on sophisticated labour management practices, to legitimise 
employer authority. Indeed it appears as a form of sophisticated manipulation in its bolstering 
of employer authority (Purcell and Sisson, 1983: 114). Conflict between management and 
workers is viewed as “unnecessary and exceptional” (Fox, 1966a: 12). Developed human 
resource policies seek to remove any conflict of interest between management and 
employees. By implication, where conflict occurs it is attributed to managerial failures in 
implementing the ‘right’ policies (Purcell, 1987). Indeed this shade of unitarism will reason 
that opposition to unions is based on the grounds that they can be made unnecessary because 
of in-house human resource practices which can, and should, supplant the union role. 
 
Table 1 summarises each of these variants of unitarism against the individual dimensions of 
employer authority, workplace conflict and trade unionism, as captured by terms highlighted 
in the preceding discussion. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
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Similar to unitarism, pluralism is likely to have its own comparable variants of emphasis. In 
order to avoid blurring the conceptual focus of this paper, which is unitarism, it is not the 
intention to explore or compare specifically elements of pluralism. Nonetheless it suffices to 
say that discussion of pluralist ideology in employment relations appears to emphasise two 
variants: Standard-Modern and a more Sophisticated-Modern position (Fox, 1974; Purcell 
and Sisson, 1983). The former is pragmatically cognisant of pluralist tendencies within the 
diffusion of authority relations and in the existence of workplace conflict, but assumes 
employment relations are “non-problematic until events prove otherwise” (Purcell and 
Sisson, 1983: 116). Its approach to unionism will be of an opportunistic or fire-fighting 
calibre: the union will be afforded a role, but it will not be enthusiastically integrated into the 
daily life of the enterprise. That is in keeping with the sophisticated modern variant, which is 
broadly more encouraging of trade unionism and may seek to integrate the institution into 
numerous facets of workplace authority relations and conflict management. 
 
Whilst the above owes a heavy debt to the constructs of Fox and later additions by 
management style scholars, the principal contribution from the framework lies in seeking to 
elaborate and build upon these classifications into a more specified set. As noted above, the 
paper addresses what type of unitarism, if any, do actively resistant employers effuse in 
accounting for their opposition to union recognition claims? More specifically, do employers 
who actively resist trade union recognition requests accept the variant types of unitarism 
offered? If so, what variant sets do these employers favour, and why? The manner in which 
these questions are answered is through empirical application of the analytical framework 
outlined above.  
 
3. The research setting 
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Given the particular and rather specialised nature of the target population - employers who 
have actively opposed trade union recognition campaigns - purposive sampling was 
deployed. This kind of sampling may be used where an enquiry seeks to study unique groups 
or processes that are especially informative or are part of a difficult to reach, specialised 
population (Yin, 2008). The study used a sample of non-union employers who were known to 
have recently opposed, or be in the process of opposing, trade union requests for recognition. 
The sample enabled the research to ascertain whether the concept of unitarism could then 
account for employer rationales in actively resisting recognition campaigns. The research 
setting was based in the Republic of Ireland, which, institutionally, resembles other liberal-
market economies such as the UK, New Zealand, Australia and the US. Parallel to these 
countries, Ireland has experienced a similar downward trajectory in union density levels and 
the issue of employer hostility has featured prominently in explanations of this trend (D’Art 
and Turner, 2003; 2005; Gall, 2010). Such difficulties spurred Irish unions in the late 1990s 
to secure a strengthened procedure for union recognition. This resulted in the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act (IRAA) 2001. The Act allows the Labour Court to issue legally 
binding recommendations compelling non-union employers to bargain with unionised 
employees on particular matters where the employer refuses to engage in collective 
bargaining at local-level. Since 2007 however, the impact of this Act has been significantly 
debilitated by employers setting up non-union staff associations: a Supreme Court ruling has 
allowed employers to claim that where non-union staff associations are in place, they 
represent bodies which may be legally interpreted to engage in collective bargaining. Such 
interpretation has obstructed the legislative route of the IRAA 2001 in establishing union 
bargaining rights (c.f. O’Sullivan and Gunnigle, 2009). 
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The specific sample in this instance is taken from the national Labour Court record which 
provides the only known and publicly available population of cases wherein non-union 
employers oppose union bargaining rights. The empirical research, conducted in 2007, 
attempted to access all reported incidents of non-union firms who opposed union recognition. 
The potential target population from the Labour Court record was 98 firms. The known 
characteristics of this population are given in Table 2. They are predominately Irish-owned 
firms and small-to-medium sized enterprises (SMEs). There is a considerable degree of 
variability in terms of sectors in the population: retail, transport, waste management, 
packaging, concrete production, pharmaceutical manufacturing and medical device 
technologies. The target within each firm was the senior executive director, chosen because 
they were expected to be either solely or significantly responsible for deciding upon the non-
union status of the firm (Kelly and Gennard, 2007). 
 
4. Research method 
Data collection comprised two methods – a questionnaire and follow-up interview 
programme. 
 
The questionnaire was principally made up of three thematic sections: ‘employer authority’, 
‘workplace conflict’ and ‘trade unionism’ respectively.  Within each thematic section, five 
statements were provided, each one reflecting a different ideological variant: either a 
Traditional, Paternalist or Human Relations variant, and to extend choices, Standard-Modern 
Pluralist and Sophisticated-Modern Pluralist variants (Appendix 1). These statements were 
taken directly from the literatures of unitarism and pluralism to ensure they were valid 
representations of the constructs under investigation. Respondents were asked to pick one 
preferred statement in each thematic section. However should none of the five statements in 
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any thematic section reflect a respondent’s preference, a “none of the above” option could be 
taken. Part of the questionnaire also sought demographic characteristics which were expected 
to have possible contextual significance. These included statements on market competition; 
product market demand; skill profile of workforce and the extent to which the firm was under 
pressure for short-term profit maximisation at the expense of long-term investment (c.f. 
Osterman, 1994). This section also asked respondents to identify the source of their ideas on 
managing employees, offering a list of alternatives derived from the relevant literatures 
(Fidler, 1981). The questionnaire was sent to the 98 firms identified via the Court’s record, 
with a return from 43 firms; a 44% response rate. A point of caution vis-à-vis any claims to 
representativeness is that the number of manufacturing firms is over-represented in the 
achieved sample. However the characteristics of respondents by firm size and national 
ownership broadly reflect population trends. 
 
Given the small sample size, it was deemed necessary to augment the questionnaire findings 
with deeper qualitative study and thus further examine respondents’ ideological preferences, 
to explain in greater depth why particular preferences were opted for. Follow-up, semi-
structured interviews with respondents were therefore pursued, using indicated preferences 
from the questionnaire to frame discussion. Access for interviews proved relatively difficult 
with 18 senior executive directors eventually consenting to participate. Where respondents 
participated in the follow-up interviews, further qualitative data was collected on those 18 
employers and their response to the union organising campaign: from the trade union 
organisers involved and from secondary documentary evidence like newspaper coverage or 
Labour Court reports. Such sources were intended to provide an additional means by which 
to understand employer ideological preferences within an account of their behavioural 
responses to union requests for bargaining rights.  
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The data was subsequently analysed in several ways. Questionnaire responses were analysed 
through frequency distributions and, where relevant, measures of association. Given that the 
interview stage produced a sizeable amount of open-ended qualitative data, the raw data was 
organised and coded into conceptual categories (Miles and Huberman, 1994). These coded 
conceptual categories were then aggregated into frequencies to identify dominant and 
recurring themes. Given the objective of seeking to explain respondent ideological 
preferences, greater analysis in this paper is devoted to the interview data over the statistical 
association and inference. This minimises some of the limitations of a statistically small 
sample size by focusing on the qualitative data which enabled more expanded detail on 
respondent choices.  
 
5. Findings 
Re-mapping ideological unitarism 
Considering the basic distributions of ideological preferences from the questionnaire, the 
findings demonstrated that a majority of the respondents favoured statements that accorded 
with the Traditional unitary posture [1]. In total, 73 (56%) of the possible 129 choices (43 
respondents with three choices each) selected statements from this ideological set. This was a 
significant majority given that of the remaining two unitary sets, Paternalism and Human 
Relations, only 19 (14%) and 16 (12%) were made respectively. Notably, Standard-Modern 
Pluralism scored just above the Human Relations ideology – with 17 (13%) from a possible 
129 choices being made. Also of note is that only four (3%) of 126 choices were made in the 
Sophisticated-Modern Pluralist group of responses.   
 
TABLE 3 HERE  
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An analysis of responses indicates a bias towards the Traditional unitarist variant across 
employer authority, workplace conflict and trade unionism. Twenty-three respondents (53%) 
opted for Traditional construal of authority compared to just five (12%) who favoured the 
Paternalist and seven (16%) who favoured the Human Relations interpretations. In fact, 
Standard-Modern Pluralism scored marginally higher on authority relations than Paternalism 
and equalled the ideological orientation of a Human Relations bent, accounting for seven of 
the 43 respondents (17%). Similarly, in relation to workplace conflict, the Traditional set 
dominates and is followed by the Paternalist. However, it is on trade unionism that the 
Traditional set is most prevalent. Here, 32 out of 43 (74%) favoured the Traditional statement 
on trade unionism.  
 
It is notable that Paternalism as an aggregate measure scored relatively poorly. Arguably this 
is an unusual finding given that the SME firms dominating the sample are often perceived to 
be conducive to such sentiments (Marlow, 2002). The low-take up of Human Relations may 
be attributable to the nature of the market context and appears to conform to interpretations 
that SMEs pursue cost-minimisation strategies in relation to human resources (Barrat and 
Rainne, 2003). Sophisticated-Modern Pluralism scored poorly across all dimensions – 
unsurprising given that respondents had already indicated their predisposition to oppose 
union recognition. The distribution indicates a substantial preference amongst firms who have 
resisted trade union recognition in the sample to opt for a hard-headed ideological posture on 
employment relations.  
 
The results in Table 4 show the relationship between demographic variables and the 
dependent ideological choices, once collapsed. Given the caveat of sample size, in most 
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instances, these were not statistically significant except for the independent variables union 
recognition and the source of ideas on managing employment relations. Here employers 
eschewed nearly all options in favour of ‘experience’ as the principal influence on their ideas.   
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The aforementioned variable of union recognition is worthy of explanatory comment. As 
evident from Table 2, six firms subsequently recognised a trade union following the unions’ 
campaign and Labour Court ruling. Significantly, two of these firms still opted for the 
Traditional unitary ideology on the trade union dimension. A further two gravitated towards 
Standard-Modern Pluralism while the remaining two displayed a Sophisticated-Modern 
Pluralist bent. This raises the problem of causality: did union recognition lead to the 
‘adoption’ of a pluralist posture, or was the ‘prior existence’ of pluralism conducive to union 
recognition?[2] The presence of a staff association was less conducive to pluralist sentiments 
among respondents. Of the five firms where a staff association was recognised, all opted for 
the Traditional unitary statements along the trade union dimension. Whilst employers did not 
acknowledge this, the existence of staff associations may have been sponsored by the 
Supreme Court ruling noted earlier. Respondent commentary from the later interview stage 
on internal staff associations were simply that they were in-house substitutes to trade unions 
and preferable to ‘outside influence’. In the interviews, respondents cast such bodies as 
information and consultative bodies and remained unreceptive to any notion that they might 
involve bargaining over terms and conditions of employment. 
 
The survey responses made by the sub-sample of the 18 company directors participating in 
the interview programme reflected the broader trend in ideological choice: 13 Traditional, 
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three Paternalist, one Human Relations and one Standard-Modern Pluralist. This enabled the 
qualitative data to explore the dominance of the Traditional ideological value set in greater 
contextual detail.  
 
Resisting union recognition campaigns 
It may be useful to contextualise the ideological dominance of Traditional unitarism in terms 
of how these 18 firms responded to union recognition campaigns. In this context the principal 
trajectory was one of sustained obstinacy characterised by the use of (not unlawful) obstacles 
which appeared ‘legitimate’; such as stonewalling and refusing access to ‘private premises’ 
(Table 5). Union efforts to engage at local-level were almost entirely fruitless, with 
employers ignoring requests. Even in those minority instances where a response was 
forthcoming from employers, it was typically a request to see a list of union members under 
the guise of ascertaining union representativeness; something which the unions involved were 
unwilling to entertain. Incidences of intimidation and suppression were recorded in only two 
firms – with union activists sacked - whilst acts of substitution to obviate the perceived need 
for union membership and representation were evident in just six of the 18 firms. Examples 
included the creation of ‘consultative forums’ and/or improvements in shift premiums. As the 
campaign for bargaining rights advanced through the latter stages of third-party mediation 
and arbitration, employers largely maintained their obstructive postures to the union. 
Voluntary conciliation meetings were either eschewed or subject to employer delay; 
invariably on the premise that the company was frequently ‘unavailable’ on a particular date. 
However union informants perceived this as a tactic designed to frustrate the campaign. Even 
in cases where the employer did attend, organisers often reported that employers would 
refuse to enter into meaningful dialogue with union officials present.  
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This apparent recalcitrance did not relent as disputes advanced to the echelon of Labour 
Court adjudication. Whilst all employers, bar two, attended Court hearings, the crux of their 
statements cast scorn on the representativeness of the union and/or the validity of union 
claims on pay and conditions. Legal technicalities were habitually raised by employer 
representatives over the authority of the Court to intervene on the matter. Employer 
compliance with Court recommendations was marginal, with unions reporting that 13 of the 
rulings from the Court were ignored. In seven instances further legal determinations were 
sought by unions on behalf of workers in those organisations. Three firms raised further legal 
challenges in the civil courts, seeking to overturn decisions favouring employees and unions. 
In none of the 18 cases was a formal bargaining relationship secured by the union. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Advancing Traditional unitarism 
It is against the tactics to resist union organising drives that the penchant for Traditional 
ideology might be more fully appreciated. From interview responses with the directors of 
these firms, content analysis, whereupon responses were categorised and their frequency 
scored, isolated the dominance of the Traditional unitary ideology by virtue of two 
explanatory factors: the perceived irrelevance of alternative unitary variants, and secondly 
ideological support for the chosen Traditional set. The former referred to other statements 
lacking relevance to the particular business context. For example the financial investment 
emphasis of Human Relations was deemed too costly, whilst the ‘Paternalistic care of 
employee welfare’ was viewed as over-bearing, even archaic and inappropriate to a 
contemporary business. Distaste of Human Relations was reducible to the claimed market 
context, as also indicated by survey preferences. However, respondents’ avoidance of 
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Paternalism did not in itself suggest a rejection of notions of creating good social relations 
between management and workers: 
 
We try to maintain a convivial atmosphere. But that’s not to say that in some respects 
strong management is needed to ensure demands on the company are met.  
(Director, Waste Management Services) 
 
Rarely did employers express hostility to Standard-Modern Pluralism. Rather avoidance 
appeared to be based on caution over the perceived extensiveness of concessions or the 
constraints of entering into a bargaining relationship on substantive matters. Where 
receptiveness to concession was articulated it was in areas of operational expediency and 
immediate matters of production. But employers interviewed expressed an unwillingness to 
extend the value of concessionary principles to the substantive regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment: 
 
The really important decisions are the preserve of management. And to be honest, 
[they] are never challenged by employees, because they don’t know about them.  
(Director, Steel Manufacturer) 
 
The second rationale advanced in support for Traditional unitarism was reducible to an 
ideological commitment to its precepts, itself revolving around two sub-factors of 
explanation. Again these were derived from categorising responses into frequency scores. 
The first, and most dominant, explained ideological commitment to Traditional unitarism in 
terms of a legal-contractual interpretation of the employment relationship. An economistic 
interpretation of the relations between buyers and sellers of labour abounded, with the 
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purchasing and subsequent ownership of labour power and time, producing an expectation of 
an unproblematic authority structure. As the Director of a Concrete Manufacturer advanced: 
 
If you’re paid the going rate, you’re treated well, you work to contract. From a business 
point of view, what’s the problem? If I hire an engineer to look at grading processes in 
the crushing plant, I don’t expect him to come back to me and go, ‘sorry I’m not doing 
this or that’, I now want you to pay me this rate’. Why can’t it be the same principle in 
employing a man in the yard? 
 
The second sub-factor explaining the ideological support for Traditional unitarism was that 
employer authority must prevail because of the negative business consequences emanating 
from employee resistance to company decision-making. Challenging employer decision-
making, it was proposed, threatened the firm’s relationship with one or more of its 
environmental or market constraints, with negative implications for all organisational 
members. Where employees might oppose measures perceived as antagonistic to their 
interests, respondents argued that they were succumbing to short-term momentary interests, 
at the expense of long-term benefit and security. For example: 
 
We’re about profits and if we’re left alone to do that, then everything else falls into 
place. Shareholders do well, customers do well. The exchequer does well, we grow our 
businesses and we employ more people. 
(Director, IT Distributor) 
 
The proclivity to view the employment relationship in a legal-contractual light sat alongside a 
an economistic view of workers. This cast workers as financially motivated and as being 
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unconcerned with the strategic direction of the company. To some extent a pronounced 
cleavage of interests in the employment relationship was tolerated, but was considered 
improper where this might manifest itself in terms of active employee opposition to 
managerial initiatives. Whatever differing interests might exist over the wage-effort bargain, 
employers subsumed these under the authority granted to them through the purchase of 
labour power or that employee acquiescence to company decision-making would in the long-
run reap dividends in the form of a successful firm with benefits for all. 
 
The hostility to trade unionism as articulated in the Traditional set was supported on the 
grounds of a perception that unions would negatively impact on the firm’s cost structure and 
managerial regulation. Trade unions were conceived as almost entirely anti-business, 
encroaching on ‘organisational flexibility’ and advancing wage demands insensitive to 
budgetary requirements. Respondents also evinced a recurring tendency to refer to the 
employer’s legal or constitutional position under existing legislative provisions on trade 
union recognition in Ireland: 
 
While I recognise the right of our workers to join a trade union, the law is such that I’m 
not obliged to negotiate with any of them. 
(Director, Security Services) 
 
Significant, was the directorial emphasis on unions’ conflictual roles. Curiously absent from 
the interviews was any recognition of the potential for accommodative union-management 
relations. Rather unions were customarily cast in a malign role, as the Director of a plastic 
manufacturer illustratively put it, “trade unionism is like a scorpion, it always stings”. 
Directors often underscored their view by adding that unions had been “targeting” particular 
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non-union firms to bolster union growth, increase recruitment and establish a new precedent 
for recognition in particular industries. Many of the directors argued that trade unions 
artificially fabricated claims over pay and conditions so as to manufacture a situation 
whereby the firm was ‘coerced’ into engagement under the legislative procedures. Indeed, 
there was consequently marked hostility not just to the trade union, but also third-party 
intervention in the form of the national Labour Court which was perceived as ill-informed 
“interference from civil servants”. Employers interviewed saw Court rulings as diluted with 
“anti-business sentiment”, “insensitive to local circumstance”, and, in one case, “totalitarian” 
in its application. The effect of unions using state legislation and referring their claims to 
state bodies, seems to have heightened employer antipathy: 
 
Employers should be left alone to fix our own rates of pay, according to our own 
individual circumstances. Whether it’s from unions or from the state, I’m opposed to 
blanket rates being imposed. 
(Director, Furniture Manufacturer) 
 
Notably hostility to unionism was not articulated on general unitary assumptions wherein 
unions cut across the pursuit of ‘common purpose’ or vie for the affections of employees to 
their employer. Rather the unitary hostility evidenced here was based upon resistance to 
interference in an assumed ‘right to manage’. 
 
6.    Discussion  
This paper began by raising existing limitations in contemporary applications of unitarism, 
focusing on the realm of active employer resistance to trade union recognition. As noted, 
employer ideological choices were seen as significant in shaping outcomes (Bryson et al. 
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2003; Heery and Simms, 2011) with unitarism being prominently cited as an explanatory 
factor. To advance understandings of unitarism in this context, a conceptual framework was 
synthesised, drawing upon prior contributions in the literature to pinpoint varieties of 
unitarism. In the subsequent fieldwork, a persistent attachment to a Traditional form of 
unitarism was found. Employers across the firms sampled predominately sought to retain 
absolute control over the company’s operations. Worker resistance was seen as unacceptable 
or, in a number of instances, unnecessary. Opposition to trade unionism did not seem to be 
based on employers fearing that recognition would split the ‘familial spirit’ nor on a belief 
that unions had been adequately substituted by non-union forms of representation. Rather 
unions were regarded as an outside intrusion into private company affairs. Such a viewpoint 
largely coalesces with what Budd and Bhave (2008) have termed the ‘eogist’ ideology of 
employment relations which eulogises employers’ (presumed) rights to pursue individual 
self-interest in the market, free from union and government regulation. In a context where 
some of the discourse on HRM and employment relations has treated declining unionisation 
as largely derived from the choices of market savvy employees (Emmot, 2006: 5), the 
findings presented in this paper would indicate that reservoirs of adversarial employer 
unitarism still flourish in obstructing workplace voice. Far from being a passive spectator of 
change in employment relations, employers, as Sisson (2006) has indicated, have been 
profoundly influential in creating barriers to union recognition. 
 
It could be advanced that the preference for Traditional-unitarism in the sample is 
unsurprising: the nature of the firms sampled might suggest that ideologies associated with 
sophisticated HRM would be unlikely in these cases (Forth et al. 2006). Yet concluding as 
such would be insensitive to understanding the role of ideology. Ideology, as noted earlier, is 
an instrument of persuasion directed at employees and the public at large. The extent to 
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which employers can make their ‘message’ convincing, as both Bendix (1956) and Fox 
(1974) have argued, secures their authority. Give this function of legitimisation one might 
have expected employers to opt for the (arguably) more ‘socially acceptable’ tenets of the 
alternative variants. It is not clear that the non-union ideology found here is palatable with the 
expectations of alternative stakeholders in liberal-democratic societies (Ackers, 2002). As a 
vehicle of ideological legitimisation, one suspects that its success in securing wider 
normative consensus might be inadequate. Furthermore, the findings are unusual in that one 
might have expected employers, from a sample of predominately SMEs, to have opted for a 
paternalist posture. It is commonly asserted that a paternalism of sorts, with its familial type 
emphasis, is the mainstay of employment relations in SME firms (Dundon et al. 1999; 
Grugulis et al. 2000; Bacon and Hoque, 2005). Paternalism might have been a more ‘socially 
acceptable’ employer ideology, given its benign resonances in contrast to the tough market 
determinism of the Traditional variant. Its absence may be due to the high number of firms 
reporting unstable demand for their products and services or tight labour market conditions 
which prevailed in Ireland at the time of the research. Both factors, as Scase (2003) notes, 
appear to work against the prevalence of Paternalism in the employment relationship. 
 
The implications of the predominant anti-unionism uncovered in this study for the matter of 
union recognition are important. Above all, the insistence on prerogatives and freedom from 
‘outside’ interference appeared to represent to the employers in the study, points of principle. 
In such instances, the type of compromise which resolves many trade disputes will be much 
more difficult to secure in the circumstances of a struggle for bargaining rights. This 
resonates with Brown et al.’s (2001) argument that legislative regimes enabling union 
recognition are no panacea. It might be further added that operating in national systems 
marked by minimal state intervention in employment relations, such legislative regimes are 
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typically too weak to adequately circumvent employer unitarism. As Gall (2010: 10-12) 
argues such regimes may paradoxically accentuate employer opposition. Indeed in this study, 
a perception existed that the relevant legislation was manipulated and prolonged by ‘outside’ 
trade unions with the aid of state employment bodies insensitive to the private sector. This 
incursion on prerogative served to heighten the employer sense of injustice and doggedness 
to remain non-union. It would seem that in Anglo-Saxon countries, legislative regimes to 
facilitate bargaining rights within the non-union terrain will in many instances face a 
significant hurdle of an ideology which has its origins far back in the historical grain of class, 
status and power of market liberalism. The core of this ideology emphasises notions of 
negative freedom; that is freedom from external interference and obstruction by others 
(Berlin, 2002: 169). Whilst of course such ideological antipathy is not in itself a sufficient 
condition for ensuring an employer’s union-free status, it is likely to be significant in shaping 
the character of their responses. The flavour of the ideology will colour the extent of 
cooperation offered, fundamentally determining the potentialities for a meaningful bargaining 
relationship.  
 
Finally, unions and advocates of pluralist values might, as Bryson et al. (2004: 142-144) 
suggest, counter this ideology by appealing to some non-union employers on the workplace 
benefits of organised (unionised) voice or, more instrumentally, through coaxing employers 
towards recognition by engendering a ‘critical mass’ of members in the relevant workplace. 
However these strategies may only be feasible in a context where employers are indifferent, 
rather than actively hostile, to trade unionism. In terms of the latter, building high 
membership density in workplaces overseen by hostile employers is often not feasible, as 
potential members are only willing to join after their employer has granted ‘approval’ of the 
union (D’Art and Turner, 2005; Heery and Simms, 2008). Those attempts at ‘attitudinal 
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restructuring’ of employer hostility through rational persuasion, whilst not entirely 
implausible, may be difficult to secure in the absence of wider institutional or structural 
change. 
Footnotes 
 [1] For purpose of analysis, respondent choices were collapsed into a homogenous set if 
either three from three or two from three choices were made from one variant. This gave, 22 
Traditional, six Paternalist, six Human Relations, seven Standard-Modern Pluralist, one 
Sophisticated-Modern Pluralist. One respondent who could not be classified was excluded, 
having made three choices across all three sets. 
[2] In this instance, one might be inclined towards the latter interpretation, although without 
being ignorant of other factors, besides ideology, which may play an important role in 
determining an employer’s decision to concede recognition. Counter-factual evidence is 
provided in the results; showing that the existence of Traditional unitarism even in the 
context of formally conceding recognition. The simple act of conceding recognition is 
unlikely to lead to the neat causal adoption of pluralist sentiments per se. 
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Table 1: Summary characteristics of unitary ideology variants 
 
  Traditional  Paternalist  Human Relations  
 
Employer 
Authority 
 
Autocratic Benevolent Autocracy Sophisticated 
Manipulation 
Workplace 
Conflict 
 
Illegitimate due to terms of 
contract 
Arise from Employee 
Misunderstandings 
 
Arise from Managerial 
Failures 
 
Trade Unionism Interferes with Managerial 
Prerogative 
Disruptive of 
familial culture 
Unnecessary because of 
In-house policies 
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Table 2: Characteristics of firms opposing union recognition* 
 Characteristic features Known 
Population  
Survey 
Respondents 
Interview 
Respondents 
Sector Agriculture, forestry & fishing 3 - - 
 Manufacturing 29 22 10 
 Construction 1 - - 
 Wholesale & retail trade 17 4 3 
 Hotels & restaurants 2 1 - 
 Transport, storage & communication 16 8 2 
 Financial & business services 8 3 2 
 Health & social work 4 - - 
 Other services 17 5 1 
 Total 98 43 18 
Organisational Size     
 Small 43 19 7 
 Medium 39 18 9 
 Large 16 6 2 
 Total 98 43 18 
Nationality     
 Irish  76 33 13 
 UK 3 1 1 
 European 8 4 2 
 US 10 5 1 
 Other 1 0 - 
 Total 98 43 18 
Union Recognition     
 Yes  6 - 
 No  37 18 
 Total  43 18 
Staff Association Recognition     
 Yes  5 2 
 No  38 16 
 Total  43 18 
Environmental Characteristics:     
Market demand for product/service is 
relatively stable 
    
 Yes  17 7 
 No  25 11 
 Total  43 18 
Substantial competition in main 
product/service market 
    
 Yes  37 16 
 No  6 2 
 Total  43 18 
Organisation under substantial pressure to 
attain short-term profits at expense of long-
term investment 
    
 Yes  35 16 
 No  8 1 
 Total  43 18 
Work carried out in firm requires majority of 
staff to be highly skilled 
    
 Yes  29 12 
 No  14 6 
 Total  43 18 
Main source of ideas on managing 
employment relations 
    
 Managers in network  0 0 
 Management experience  31 16 
 Management books  2 0 
 Management training  1 0 
 Religious beliefs  0 0 
 Political affiliations  0 0 
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 News/media coverage  0 0 
 Industry association advice   9 2 
 Government publications  0 0 
 Other  0 0 
 Total  43 18 
     
     
Note: The classifications of sector, size and nationality used to categorise the demographic characteristics of firms in Table 2 are used for 
the following reasons. First, it was feasible to determine these characteristics in the known population by researching company profiles in 
public databases, specifically Kompass Business Directory and Solocheck Business Directory. Secondly, focusing on the demographics of 
sector, size and nationality have a theoretical justification: the literature specifies that non-unionism, and union avoidance, tends to be 
strongly associated with variations in each of these (McLoughlin and Gourlay, 1994; Ram and Edwards, 2003). 
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Table 3: Distributions on unitary ideological sets by ‘authority relations’, ‘workplace conflict’ and 
‘trade unionism’ 
 
  Traditional Paternalist Human 
Relations 
Standard-
Modern 
Pluralism 
Sophisticated-
Modern 
Pluralism 
Authority Relations 23 (53%) 5 (12%) 7 (16%) 7 (16%) 1 (2%) 
Workplace Conflict 18 (42%) 13(30%) 4 (9%) 7 (16%) 1 (2%) 
Trade Unionism 32 (74%) 1 (2%) 5 (12%) 3 (7%) 2 (5%) 
 73 (56%) 19 (14%) 16 (12%) 17 (13%) 4 (3%) 
N=129      
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Table 4: Ideological orientation by demographics 
 x2 df p 
Nationality 9.366 16 .89 
Sector 3.941 4 .41 
Size 14.676 8 .06 
Source of Ideas 24.73 12 .016 
Staff Association 1.006 4 .909 
Trade Union Recognition 17.5 4 .002 
Market Demand 19.537 12 .07 
Market competition 13.072 12 .364 
Short-term profits/long-term 
investment 
2.428 8 .09 
Skilled staff 16.732 12 .16 
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Table 5: Ideological orientation by reported employer responses to union recognition 
campaign 
 
 Traditional 
(n=13) 
Paternalist 
(n=3) 
Human Relations 
(n=1) 
Standard-Modern 
Pluralist 
(n=1) 
Reported employer 
responses 
    
Ignoring union 
requests to meet at 
local-level 
 
 
11 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
Union activists sacked 
 
2 - - - 
Resolving non-pay 
grievances 
 
1 1 - - 
Improving pay  and 
financial benefits 
 
3 1 - 1 
Setting up non-union 
forum 
 
3 - 1 - 
Employer petition 
 
1 - - - 
Refusing to attend 
third-party 
interventions/hearings 
 
6 1 - - 
Refusing to 
implement third party 
recommendations 
 
12 1 1 - 
Taking legal action in 
civil courts against 
Court ruling 
3 - - - 
Sources: Trade union organisers interviewed; Labour Court Documentation; Industrial Relations News Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Ideological dimensions and operational indicators 
 
Dimensions/Set 
 
Operational Indicator 
 
Traditional 
  
Authority 
Relations 
As management is responsible for the successful operation of the company, it must retain 
absolute authority over all aspects of business operations. 
 
Workplace 
Conflict 
Efforts by employees to actively resist important company decisions are unacceptable and 
must be countered by firm management action. 
 
Trade Unionism Trade union intrusion into private company affairs is opposed as it would result in 
unwarranted interferences into managements’ right to run the business as it sees fit.  
Paternalist   
Authority 
Relations 
Management responsibilities extend not just to the successful financial performance of the 
company but also to the paternalistic care of employees’ welfare. 
 
Workplace 
Conflict 
Conflict at work arises from a lack of employee understanding that management decisions 
are made with the welfare of all in mind; employees should therefore place their trust in 
management.  
 
Trade Unionism Trade union involvement in this firm is opposed as it would split the strong family spirit 
which management has striven to foster. 
Human 
Relations 
  
Authority 
Relations 
Considerable financial resources must be invested into employee relations to ensure that 
management authority is fully supported by staff. 
 
Workplace 
Conflict 
Failures by management to financially invest in meeting employees’ need at work are the 
most significant cause of workplace unrest. 
 
Trade Unionism Any role that a trade union might play in this company has been rendered unnecessary 
through management’s financial investment in good employee relations policies and 
practices.   
Standard-
Modern 
Pluralism  
  
Authority 
Relations 
As employees have some interests which differ from management, certain aspects of 
employee relations will have to be subject to a process of negotiation, compromise and 
consent. 
 
Workplace 
Conflict 
Inevitable conflicts of interest between management and employees are best resolved 
through a process of negotiation, compromise and consent. 
Trade Unionism Where an individual employee has disciplinary and/or grievance issues, it is acceptable for 
him/her to involve their trade union representative. 
Sophisticated-
Modern 
Pluralism 
  
Authority 
Relations 
Joint decision-making with a trade union is conducive to maintaining greater order and 
stability at work.  
Workplace 
Conflict 
Trade unions are useful in helping management to resolve conflicts in the workplace.  
Trade Unionism Collective bargaining with a trade union is a useful way for settling differences between 
management and employees. 
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Sources: Statements derived from existing accounts of unitarism-pluralism as found in Fox (1966a; b; 1971; 
1974); Purcell and Sisson (1983); Salamon (2002); Rose (2004). 
 
